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Current issues
In the Sixties, in socialist countries, social scientists were paying a 
great deal o f attention to problems related to the structure of 
society and to alienation. From the middle o f the Seventies on, 
however, a new topic came to the forefront, that of industrial 
democracy and the conditions necessary for this to function 
effectively. The increasing interest in this subject is shown by the 
numbers of articles, books and dissertations appearing in recent 
years, and by the success of conferences and discussions on the 
subject of participation. There are a number of reasons for this 
debate.
First, the structure and composition of the Hungarian working 
class has been changing. After the Second World War Hungary 
developed its socialist industry and this process established and 
stabilised working-class power and produced new organisational 
forms o f worker participation. At the same time, between 1949 
and 1973, the number of industrial workers, as compared with the 
number o f all active earners, increased from 37 per cent to 58 per 
cent (Benedek 1977).
Changes have also occurred in the structure o f the working class 
with a major increase in the proportion o f skilled workers and 
managers. This led to an increase in living standards. For example, 
the value o f per capita national income increased between 1950
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and 1973 from 300 dollars (International Statistical Annual, 1970, 
1974 and Statistical Annual 1973.) to about 1000 dollars*. In 
addition to the considerable growth in the national income, 
further improvements in workers’ living standards were produced 
through social achievements such as full employment, the 
introduction o f social security benefits and of free medical 
treatment. All o f these developments influenced the job 
satisfaction and motivation of the workers. Full employment 
meant that workers were no longer concerned with job security 
since this was now guaranteed by the State. The structure of the 
labour force was also altered by the numbers of young people who 
became wage earners, In 1973, for the first time**, the number of 
young people under thirty exceeded one million (central statistical 
office, 1974). These changes not only increased the importance of 
industrial workers in the Hungarian economy and raised living 
standards, but also changed the nature o f workers’ needs and 
expectations. These became more differentiated. Today while 
there are people who see work in narrow instrumental terms, as a 
means of earning a living, and are not interested in social relations 
or job content, others wish to participate in the decision-taking 
activities o f the enterprise. Industrial democracy has been 
stimulated by these new attitudes to work and this desire for 
involvement.
Economic factors have also played a part in the increased 
interest in participation. Since the end of the Sixties Hungary has 
experienced a shortage o f labour as traditional sources such as 
agriculture and young people have dried up. This meant that 
economic growth could no longer be a result of increasing the size 
of the industrial labour force. In consequence, manpower policy 
and an improved utilisation o f manpower became a key question 
for management as only in this way could productivity be raised.
On 1 January 1968, a number o f economic reforms came into 
force. Company management was given greater independence and 
new measures to improve working and living conditions were 
introduced. But, during the period 1973-4 the Hungarian economy 
experienced some problems. The imported industrial price o f raw 
materials and of oil suddenly increased. These changes drew 
attention to the need for improved management, particularly an 
ability to adapt to changing external economic conditions. This 
required some new attitudes from management.
* Per capita national income was calculated at the rate o f dollars in 1968.
** By 1973 the proportion o f  young people under thirty already exceeded 
1222000 within the working class while during the previous ten years it had not 
reached 1 million.
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At the same time Hungarian workers were expecting an 
improved quality of working life. Traditional methods of 
management that had previously proved effective were no longer 
able to secure the co-operation of individuals and groups, 
although a new philosophy of management had not yet been 
formulated. The solution emerged spontaneously from improved 
communication and increased co-operation between management 
and workers. These changes stimulated interest in shop-floor 
democracy and workers’ participation.
W orkers’ participation cannot be separated from politics and 
social philosophy. A key function of politics is to ensure the unity 
of thought and action of the various social groups building a 
particular society. Congress XI o f the Hungarian Socialist 
W orkers’ Party made a major contribution to the social guidance 
of the Seventies. It accepted that conflicting human demands and 
interests feature even in a socialist society. A source of this conflict 
is the different interests that arise from the division of labour. This 
means that different interests will occur within the working class, 
as well as between classes.
Different interests produce social conflict and this in turn 
affects the way in which society and the economy functions. The 
task of those responsible for guiding society is not to suppress 
these conflicts, but to reveal and solve them. In doing this we have 
to face the fact that the growth of such conflict in a socialist 
society, and within socialist firms, may be a contradiction to the 
aims o f this society. Company management is often unable to 
recognise the differentiated and dynamic nature of workers’ 
interests and to take the necessary steps to cater for these. This 
difficulty leads logically to allowing worker participation in the 
management o f the company’s affairs and in decision-making. In 
this way it becomes possible to create policies and tasks that are 
acceptable from the point of view o f both management • and 
workers. Worker participation is at the same time a concrete 
exercise o f power by the working class that demonstrates the 
presence or absence of participation in public affairs. As a result 
of Hungary’s increasing prosperity, the question of ‘what to live 
on’, is being superseded by that o f ‘how to live’ (Minutes of 
Congress XI o f the Hungarian Socialist W orkers’ Party, 1975); in 
other words by an emphasis on the quality of working life.
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Job versus power-orientated participation
Before describing Hungarian experience with shop-floor 
democracy, we shall discuss briefly what we mean by the term 
‘participation’.
Interest in worker participation goes back to the early studies in 
industrial sociology. On the fiftieth anniversary of the Hawthorne 
experiments Dr R.L. Kahn re-examined the results of that research 
and suggested that the change in attitudes within the work groups 
was not solely a consequence of the greater attention paid to the 
workers. It was strongly influenced -by the fact that those taking 
part in the experiment were allowed to make decisions about their 
work and working conditions. Therefore it was not because the 
workers were the centre of attention — the so-called ‘Hawthorne 
effect’ — that favourable group reactions occurred; it was the 
opportunity for participation and for exercising control. Kahn 
reported that: ;’during the five-year test, people working in the 
experimental workshop took part to an increased degree in making 
decisions that affected their work and working conditions directly 
(i.e. establishing o f time o f rest and of the wages), and they reacted 
to these possibilities as stimulation by displaying definite activity’ 
(Kahn, 1974). But, although the concept o f worker participation is 
not new, discussion of how to introduce and structure this form of 
democracy is still very active, and has become increasingly active 
during the Seventies. Both theoreticians and practitioners expect 
positive results from the application of the ^participation 
principle’. In Hungary it is seen not only as a means for increasing 
job satisfaction but also as a way of assisting the success of 
socialist democracy. All specialists in participation are agreed on 
this point even though they are interested in different aspects of 
industrial democracy. For example, some scholars are particularly 
concerned with the institutions o f participation; others regard 
their primary task as determining the types o f decisions to which 
the workers may most usefully contribute. A number see 
participation as contributing to the harmonisation o f workers’ 
needs and expectations in work.
There are two principal philosophies o f participation. One 
focuses on participation in work activities, or ‘job-orientated 
participation’. The other takes a wider view and views 
participation as a means for controlling work performance and 
working conditions. This is the so-called ‘power (interests) 
orientated participation’. The subscribers to the ‘job-orientated 
participation’ philosophy believe that participation in work 
activities and in the design and control of tasks may have positive
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effects, such as increased job satisfaction, higher achievement, or 
a lower level o f labour turnover. This belief is based on two sets of 
theories. First, on theories o f job design (Davis et.al., 1972), 
second, theories derived from psychology (Herzberg, 1969).
F.W . Taylor can be ranked among the pioneers of job- 
orientated participation even though he called his principles and 
approach ‘scientific management’ and certainly did not have an 
increase in worker control as one o f his objectives. Taylor 
regarded the workers’ role in industry as similar to that of a cog­
wheel and he saw management-worker collaboration as a way of 
improving its efficiency. The central idea of scientific management 
was to improve the efficiency o f the job. Therefore, management 
analysed and structured the job o f each worker with great 
accuracy and thoroughness. In most cases the workers received 
written instructions concerning how they should do their work. 
The improvement o f efficiency was seen as a product o f the 
combined efforts of the management and workers. The workers 
carried out the task but were told not only what to do and how to 
do it but how long to spend on each task (Taylor, 1911).
Since the beginning o f this century two major changes have 
occurred in the social-economic conditions of industry. These 
changes have influenced the nature of workers’ needs and 
expectations, as well as o f the requirements of the organisation. 
For example, the educational level of the workers has considerably 
increased, while the meeting o f basic human needs is today 
virtually guaranteed. Therefore, it is no longer acceptable to let the 
structure of jobs be determined solely by the demands of 
technology and o f efficient administration. Consideration must 
also be given to the needs and expectations o f the workers. Here 
the philosophies of the socio-technical and job design schools of 
thought provide useful guidance. These differ from the traditional 
concept o f job satisfaction (Herzberg, 1968) — which implies that 
the worker will adapt to his job — in that they strive to meet the 
workers’ needs through the way in which technology is used and 
jobs are structured. The requirements o f technology are no longer 
given priority over the workers’ social needs.
Although the use of socio-technical principles does nothing to 
destroy the logic o f mass production, it at least shows an 
awareness that the nature o f workers’ needs has undergone a 
considerable change during the last half century.
The idea of job orientated participation takes an unusual form 
in the work o f Hungarian scholars interested in shop-floor 
democracy. This defines worker participation as an active and 
regular participation in all production activities with increased
Worker participation and the socialist enterprise 301
involvement leading to greater responsibility. This view implies 
that the development of worker participation depends upon two 
factors: first, the workers’ maturity and awareness and, second, 
on the effectiveness of communication. Management’s principal 
task is to keep the workers clearly and adequately informed of the 
most important issues affecting their work. The workers are then 
in a position to express a view on even the most difficult and 
complicated questions. Scholars interested in identifying the 
conditions necessary for effective participation have dealt chiefly 
with questions such as the following: the relationship between 
managerial autonomy and collective leadership; the difference 
between the officially accepted and actual competences of 
management; the nature of worker participation at different stages 
o f decision taking — i.e. the first proposal to the final decision, 
and the amount of contact needed with different management 
levels and functions — to ensure that participation is effective. 
This research has produced many theoretical ideas of assistance to 
management thinking. In order to show the nature of this research 
we have developed a model of those criteria which lead to the 
maximum participation of workers in company management. This 
model is very detailed and so only the principle variables are 
described in this paper. When aiming at the maximum 
participation of workers the following factors must be considered:
1. The nature o f  the management activity e.g. planning, 
developing collective labour contracts, setting standards for 
working conditions and the work environment.
2. Forms o f  participation in decision making e.g. proposals, 
opinion, consultation, joint worker-manager decisions.
3. Organisational level e.g. enterprise, factory, workshop, 
workroom.
Hungarian adherents of job-orientated participation have called 
attention to several important aspects of shop-floor democracy; 
for example, to the need for different kinds of participation at 
different stages o f decision-making; to the necessity for clear and 
effective systems of communication, and to the need for 
determining an equitable division o f managing rights and 
responsibilities. This research generally focuses on problems of 
interest to management.
Less attention is paid, however, to other aspects of industrial 
democracy. There is little examination o f participation in practice 
and little investigation o f how different organisational structures 
and objectives assist or hinder the satisfaction of workers’ needs. 
Production efficiency and high-level work performance are viewed
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as important objectives for all socialist enterprises and it is 
assumed that workers will automatically identify themselves with 
these. If this does not happen then it is due to workers not fully 
understanding the nature o f these objectives and it is 
management’s task to inform and convince them. But it is not 
solely a lack of understanding that impedes successful worker 
participation, more complex questions are involved, many of 
which relate to the nature o f work itself.
Job-orientated participation therefore focuses upon only one 
aspect of the workers’ participation, although a very important 
aspect namely the improvement of work efficiency. It does not 
consider questions of different or conflicting interests or of power. 
Yet these explain much o f the resistance with which initiatives 
aimed at introducing new forms of work organisation are received. 
Often it is not the trades unions, but the workers themselves who 
refuse opportunities for more influence and independence in their 
work activities. The basis o f their objections is usually that greater 
responsibility will not lead to higher earnings (Goldmann, 1976). 
The reaction has been encountered, for example, when a work 
group is allowed to decide on how wages shall be divided within 
the group but is unable to control those factors that affect the 
amount the group can earn — availability o f raw materials, 
machine stoppages etc. Also, giving work groups responsibility for 
decision-taking impinges on management’s interests and power. 
Certain levels o f management such as foremen may feel their job is 
losing its status and importance. This can explain managerial 
opposition to increased worker participation; and can lead to 
attempts to preserve traditional methods and philosophy. All of 
these reactions emphasise the need to take a broader view of job- 
orientated participation. In order to understand the conditions for 
successful participation, we have to go outside the narrow 
dimensions of work and examine power and interest relationships 
within the organisation and even within society.
This approach is called power-orientated participation. Its 
objective is to increase workers’ influence within socialist 
enterprises in those areas of decision-making which affect their 
interests.* It will be asked why the concept o f power-orientated 
participation has relevance in a socialist society where there are no 
irreconcilable and fundamental contradictions between the 
interests o f the various social groups. Surely job-orientated
* Within industrial organisations we consider participation based on power 
relations more significant than participation based on identity o f values. On the 
other hand, in the political parties, greater importance is attached to participation 
based on common values.
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participation will meet the needs o f the socialist enterprise.
However, it is a well-known and established fact that the 
objectives of socialist society and the socialist enterprise do not 
coincide automatically with the interests and aims o f socialist 
individuals and groups. Because o f the division of labour, 
differences and conflicts can occur between central and local 
organisations, between different functions and between different 
groups of workers within the same plant, as well as between 
workers and management. It follows that a fundamental question 
for socialist enterprises is how to maintain the co-operation of 
individuals and groups while internal and external conditions are 
constantly changing.
Since co-operation is a product o f common interests, the main 
task of management is the reconciliation of different interests.
The stable functioning o f an organisation requires both 
technological and economic efficiency and an ability to meet the 
interests of different groups of employees. Technological and 
economic efficiency is usually catered for in the way in which the 
enterprise is structured. But this structure affects the interests of 
the individuals and groups responsible for production. 
Management can assist the satisfaction of workers’ interests 
through its personnel policies and reward systems.* Although the 
satisfaction of workers’ interests is also influenced by the 
opportunities for action outside the organisation. The social- 
economic environment of the enterprise not only stimulates needs 
and interests but also contributes to the satisfaction of these.
4
Interests: the relationship between socio-organisational 
conditions and employee needs
Interests are defined as attitudes which are a product of socially 
defined human needs and o f the socio-organisational conditions 
which determine their satisfaction, for example, work organisation 
and promotion and financial reward systems. Different human 
needs and socio-organisational conditions produce different 
structures o f interests. Hungarian research shows that financial- 
economic factors dominate workers’ needs (e.g. the level of 
earnings. (Mod, 1974; Hethy and Mako, 1976). This does not 
mean, however, that workers are only interested in what they can 
earn and place little importance on other aspects of work. Their
* Organisational conditions aimed at meeting the workers’ needs include 
incentive systems, and promotion policies.
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need structure is a constellation o f factors in which each has its 
own degree of emphasis. For instance, in addition to economic 
rewards, workers place great importance on the social circum­
stances in which they work ‘to earn their money’. The results of 
the Hungarian contribution to an international study on 
‘Automation and the industrial workers’, showed this clearly 
(Hethy and Mako, manuscript). (See Table 14.1.)
Satisfaction was closely associated with opportunities for ‘good 
pay’ (0.33) and with a belief that supervisors rewarded workers 
fairly (0.37). This shows that even at the present level of 
Hungarian socio-economic development workers are still 
interested in more money. They attach great importance to 
getting ‘a fair wage for a fair day’s work’. But shop-floor 
democracy and worker participation means more than satisfaction 
of the workers’ economic needs, it is not the same as ‘wage- 
bargaining’. In order to understand the conditions for effective 
participation we have to examine the totality of workers’ needs.
Participation opportunities and requirements
In the life o f the enterprise everything directly or indirectly affects 
working conditions, and changes in these, in turn, influence the 
nature o f workers’ interests. But recognition that ‘everything 
connects with everything’ does not assist understanding. We need 
to know whicl^ factors are o f greater and lesser importance to 
workers and appreciate how different socio-organisational 
conditions affect worker satisfaction. We can then attempt to 
establish the most appropriate subjects for participative decision­
making.
To summarise, in the present stage of Hungarian socio­
economic development the workers’ economic needs are still the 
most important influences on satisfaction. Workers are extremely 
interested in how changes in working conditions will influence 
their wages and financial prospects. This emphasis on economic 
factors influences workers’ attitudes to participation in decision- 
taking.
The workers’ view of opportunities for participation broadly 
corresponded with that of the managers. (See Table 14.2.) Both 
workers and managers indicated an absence jaf opportunities for 
participation in questions such as: the development of the 
production plan, the introduction of new machinery and
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Table 14.1 Significant correlation between ‘job provides’ items 
and general job satisfaction
‘Jobprovides’ items Correlations
A. Work content
1. Knowledge and training. 0.17
2. Opportunity to learn new things. 0.13
3. Interesting work. 0.25
4. Chance to develop abilities. 0.27
5.‘ Chance to develop professional knowledge. 0.23
B. Pay
1. Good pay. 0.33
C. Management
1. Supervisor gives instructions. 0.20
2. Supervisor listens to you. 0.22
3. Supervisor gives just reward. 0.37
4. Supervisor has sufficient skills. 0.28
equipment, personnel planning and the hiring o f workers.
Both workers and managers perceived opportunities for 
selecting workers for training courses,-the alfO'cafton of overtime 
work and o f bonuses, and the determination o f other incentives.
Differences in the opinions o f workers and managers are to be 
found in questions such as: workers’ job classification and 
„  promotion, the determination of the basis and methods of wage 
payment, the discharge of workers and matters relating to 
discipline and job transfer. In these decision areas the workers 
suggest that decisions are taken by managers alone, or jointly with 
the workers, in equal proportions. Managers however believe that 
these decisions are all made jointly.
Workers’ and managers’ opinions on opportunities for 
participation are therefore similar. They perceive join decisions on 
questions which directly affect the workers’ job but little 
participation in matters which have a less direct influence on 
workers.
The willingness of workers to share in plant-wide decision­
making is related to opportunities for participation. In the 
research on ‘Automation and W orkers’ a majority of respondents 
(52 per cent) expressed a willingness to participate in decisions 
affecting their own work, and two-thirds o f the most skilled
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workers (machine-adjusters) were prepared to do this. However, 
the percentage of workers who would like to participate in all 
plant-wide decisions hardly exceeds one-third (33.5 per cent) of the 
respondents, and only one-fifth of the most qualified workers 
desired such extensive participation.
Desired participation is, therefore, closely related to 
opportunities for participation.* But research on shop-floor 
democracy suggests that successful participation requires more 
from workers than a willingness to participate. First, shared 
decision-making requires particular social and psychological skills; 
second, it requires a level o f motivation higher than that 
traditionally expected of workers. Until now such skills and 
motivation were regarded as management’s prerogative.
Worker participation: required skills and motivation
Power-orientated participation requires from the workers 
individual or collective skills which enable them to recognise, and 
also to press and enforce their interests. They need to possess the 
knowledge, means and opportunities for action through which 
they can achieve their individual or collective interests within the 
enterprise. This means that they must be clear about their needs, 
and also appreciate the social-organisational conditions which 
permit the satisfaction of these needs. In addition, the workers 
have to choose, and get management and other groups of workers 
to accept, the strategies most likely to assist the realisation of their 
interests.
The ability of a group to achieve its interests ** is influenced by 
such factors as: the level of general and professional education, 
length o f service, intelligence, etc. These are, however, necessary 
but not sufficient conditions. The critical factor is the action 
alternatives permitted to the group by other groups. Therefore the 
ability o f a group to realise its interests requires both personal 
abilities and support from other groups.
We have suggested that opportunities for change within an 
organisation play a major part in developing the necessary skills to
* Data from the international project on Automation and the industrial workers 
are similar. According to the data o f sixteen countries, the most important 
condition for participation is the existence o f opportunities for participation.
** In our view, power is identical with the social capacity to enforce interests, as 
described above. We have omitted to use the term ‘power’ since both the 
everyday and scientific terminology identify power almost exclusively with 
political power. (Mako, 1977).
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Table 14.2 Workers’ and managers’ opinion o f the opportunity 
for participation*
W orkers’ opinion Managers’ opinion **
Types o f  decision
Opportunity fo r  
participation
Doesn't
Yes 
%
Opportunity fo r  
participation
Doesn’t
No
%
know
%
Yes
%
N o
%
kno
%
24 1 60 40 —
28 8 96 — 4
36 3 90 10 —
40 3 100 — —
48 3 M 3 __
45 7 1 (10 — —
52 2 63 37 —
45 10 8_3 17 —
48 8 80 20 —
52- 6 87 13 —
59 11 10 86 4
65 11 7 93 —
1.. Work organisation and
wo rk conditions. 75
2. Selection o f  workers for
training courses. 64
3. Allocation o f  overtime
work. 61
4. Determination o f bonuses
and other incentives. 57
| 5. Workers’ job  classification 
,! and pay scale. 1*9
! 6. Promotion o f  workers. 48
7. Determination o f basis and
meth ods o f wage pay men t. 46
8. Lay-off and discharge of
workers, 45 _
9. Disciplinary measures.______ 44
10. Transfer to other work
places. 42
11. Development o f production
plan. 30
12. Introduction o f  new
machinery and equipment. 24
13. Personnel planning (planning 
of future workforce
demands). 13
14. Hiring o f  workers. 11
76
82
11
7
17
10
83
87
*Source: Hethy and Mako, 1975® pp. 96-7,
**Workers and managers worked in the same departments. Thus the workers 
were the subordinates o f  the managers in the table.
achieve change. Since the Sixties, the demand for labour has 
grown in Hungary, whilst the supply of labour has remained static 
or decreased. As a result, labour turnover has increased. This has 
provided the workers with opportunities for securing wage 
increases (Hethy and Mako, 1975b). From a sociological point of 
view, leaving a firm can be regarded as the utilisation of one o f the
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many alternatives for action available to the workers; it is also an 
effective strategy for achieving their interests. Increased labour 
turnover has called attention to the ‘price’ of workers’ 
participation.
Managers sometimes regard the right to intervene in decisions 
of various types as a ‘gift’ presented to the workers. Those who 
hold this view expect that workers will accept opportunities for 
participation without questioning the scope or nature of these. In 
their view the workers will be glad to take advantage of increased 
opportunities for participation. Sociological studies of worker 
participation, and other research, does not, however, support this 
optimistic assumption.
Evidence suggests that workers do not always make use of the 
new opportunities afforded to them. And in those workshops 
where workers have accepted the opportunity for participation 
(Hethy and Mako, 1977), managers-workers relationships have 
not taken a ‘donor-donee’ form. In these situations management 
was aware that the co-ordination of different interests required 
effort and motivation from both managers and workers, with 
workers willing to assume responsibilities very different from their 
traditional ones. But worker participation which involves the 
reconciliation o f different interests will always have its winners 
and losers. The social-economic position o f one work group will 
become stronger or more stable, while that o f another will weaken. 
Inevitably this will lead to strained relations. Therefore 
management has to recognise that a form of shop-floor democracy 
which requires the co-ordination o f different interests must also 
involve social conflict.
Management without participation does not require this kind of 
m otivation from  workers. Only those with managerial 
responsibilities are required to handle social conflict. Therefore 
worker participation based on achieving consensus and agreement 
requires both a new structure of tasks and responsibilities and new 
ways of handling power. Workers will have to be able to cope with 
the psychological stress associated with mediating between 
different attitudes and demands. They will also have to accept the 
risk that their suggestions, if implemented, may not produce the 
improvements they seek. Unsuccessful ideas will almost certainly 
directly or indirectly affect the social-economic position and 
interests of other managers and workers. For example, if at a 
consultative meeting, workers ask for an improvement in the 
standards o f machine maintenance, they then effectively take on 
the role o f the maintenance section supervision, and even that of 
the maintenance men themselves. This criticism o f maintenance
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will affect the relationships between machine operators and 
maintenance staff and supervision and can cause bad feeling, in 
this way reducing worker solidarity. It is these kinds of social 
conflict that ‘raise the price’* of worker participation in plant- 
wide decisions, and management must recognise this when 
extending shop-floor democracy. Moreover, workers will not 
always express their doubts openly about management’s 
proposals, preferring to assume a position of ‘wait and see’. 
Workers who are reasonably satisfied with their social-economic 
position may not be interested in participating in decision-taking 
and this may slow down the length of time required for 
management to reach agreement with the workers. Even when 
management proposals are seen as unacceptable, workers may 
prefer to leave the plant rather than enter into open conflict with 
management. From their point of view this is a ‘cheaper’ way of 
looking after their interests than arguing with management about 
plant decisions.
However, socialist industrial relations do assist the 
reconciliation o f different interests, and difficulties are not as 
great as the previous section might suggest. The socialist enterprise 
is structured in such a way that the technical, economic and 
organisational requirements o f production can be achieved 
through co-operative effort. Shortages of labour and the need to 
increase efficiency make company management take account of 
workers’ interests, but, in addition the socialist enterprise has an 
organisational structure that assists co-operation. In this the trades 
union and party organisation have a major role in maintaining the 
level of co-operation necessary for effective production. If 
management overstresses the technical and economic requirements 
of production, the enterprise’s trades union and party 
organisations must emphasise human needs. Moreover, it is the 
party organisations and the trades unions that are responsible for 
shop-floor democracy and worker participation.
The role of the party organisations in developing shop-floor 
democracy is varied and will not be discussed here. In this chapter 
we will focus on the role o f the trades unions.
* There is likely to be an increase in conflicts o f a psychological character because 
of an increase o f  ‘non-programmed decisions’. This will lead to psychological 
stress. The need to deal with this kind o f stress increases the price o f  participation 
in the workers’ view. As stress evoked by decisions see Toffler, 1970.
310 The quality o f  working life
Worker participation and the trades union
The development o f worker participation cannot be separated 
from the role and function of trades unions within the socialist 
firm, for socialist ownership has brough about changes in trades- 
union activity at both national and company levels. We shall 
examine these changes first of all in relation to the shop-floor, 
comparing representative or indirect participation with the direct 
form with which this chapter is concerned.
The nature of socialist industrial relations has led to the 
developments of two functions for trades unions. First, as 
representatives of the working class, they are responsible for 
ensuring that industry achieves the objectives of Hungarian 
society, and they must educate and organise workers to this end. 
This requires an emphasis on such things as improving the 
productivity o f labour, developing workers’ consciousness, 
awaking their interest in social problems. In a socialist society, 
however, workers are not only owners of the means of production, 
they are also employees. Because a large majority o f wage earners 
— more than 90 per cent — are members o f trades unions, the 
trades unions must safeguard and represent the interests of many 
different groups of workers. These different interests have an 
influence on the kind of co-operation that is found within a 
socialist enterprise. Trades union have a major role in reconciling 
the interests of different groups of workers, and the interests of 
workers and management; while at the same time safeguarding the 
interests of all workers.
In this respect trades unions have a number of rights, 
guaranteed by law, which provide different ways in which 
workers’ interests can be protected. For example, trades unions 
have the right to make suggestions and express views' on 
management proposals that will affect a large group of workers, 
for example, the development of strategic plans. The agreement of 
trades unions is required on questions such as collective labour 
contracts and safety measures. Trades union agreement is also 
needed on hourly rates of pay, the amount of financial assistance 
given for home building and on the numbers of paid and non-paid 
holidays. Finally, trades unions direct and control with an 
independent right o f  decision matters concerning social insurance, 
labour safety and organised holidays.
These wide ranging rights are set out in the Hungarian Labour 
Code as political rights. This means that the workers can assert 
them through representative bodies such as the Trade Union
Worker participation and the socialist enterprise 311
Council and Trade Union Committee, and through trades-union 
officials.
At the beginning o f this chapter we referred to the social and 
economic changes that occurred in the Hungarian economy at the 
end of the Sixties. These changes influenced the position of trades 
unions within the enterprise. The economic reforms introduced at 
the beginning of 1968 not only increased the independence of 
firms, they also widened the rights of trades unions. Trades unions 
now secured a right o f protest or right o f  veto which increased 
their ability to safeguard the interests o f the workers. As a result of 
this right, trades unions are in a position to block economic 
measures that contravene laws and orders — e.g. requirements of 
the collective labour contract — or are in conflict with socialist 
values. The right o f veto can also be used in other matters 
affecting workers’ interests, such as ill-considered incentive 
schemes, arbitrary disciplinary procedures, etc.
It is important to understand how these trades-union rights are 
enforced and how the workers view the efficiency of this 
representative democracy in safeguarding their interests. (See 
Table 14.3.)
In Hungary there have been few sociological studies of how the 
trades unions safeguard workers’ interests. What research has 
been carried out has used different approaches and methods and 
this makes a comparison o f results difficult. Any conclusions must 
therefore be treated with caution. In the next section we provide a 
summary of this research.*
The international study on Automation and Industrial W orkers’ 
contained a group of questions on trades-union activity. Through 
these it was hoped to establish the different trades-unions 
activities.
It can be seen that workers expect the trades unions first o f all to 
iook after their individual or collective interests; to assist when 
they are in dispute with management; improve their financial 
situation; to provide opportunities for organised holidays, and to 
improve their working conditions and environment. They are less 
interested in pressure for ‘humanisation of work’ or in the 
development o f cultural and educational activities within the 
enterprise. They attach least importance to the improvement of 
productivity or the development of increased political awareness.
* According to the research results at our disposal, workers pay little attention to, 
and are slightly interested in, trades-union activity at national level. If they 
consider it, they regard it as better and more effective than trades-union activity 
at the level o f the firm. Since the latter affects the workers more closely we shall
discuss it first.
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In this research we found no difference between the attitudes of 
workers in automated or traditional jobs. Technology therefore 
appeared to have no influence on needs for trades-union 
protection.*
According to the data shown in the table, the majority of 
workers think that the trades union gives sufficient attention to the 
activities that are expected o f it.** But the number of answers in 
the ‘gives too little attention’ category is still considerable. Many 
workers believe that the trades union pays little attention to the 
activities to which they attach great importance e.g. disputes, 
earnings, holidays and working conditions.
The functioning of the indirect, representative, form o f worker 
participation has also been examined by the Hungarian Trades 
Unions’ own research institute. During their investigation they 
came to the conclusion that consultative committees to safeguard 
workers’ interests at plant level, e.g. production committees, 
trades-union meetings, etc. are not always effective in doing this. 
At these meetings workers are only informed of decisions that 
have already been made. Managers listen to the workers, but they 
take no subsequent action, and even trades-union officials do not 
know the answers to many questions. The workers comment on 
these deficiencies in the following way: ‘Everybody can say what 
he likes here, but no-one will listen to him’, or ‘I gave my opinion, 
but nothing happened, and so I no longer give it’ (Kerekes 1977).
Other research on worker participation draws attention to 
further shortcomings of representative (indirect) participation. For 
example, the contradiction that in matters which affect their 
personal interests directly such as working conditions, the workers 
can only draw attention to their problems indirectly, through 
trades-union meetings. Yet it is on such questions that they have 
most knowledge. In contrast they can participate directly in 
decisions of less significance to their personal interests, such as the 
award o f the title o f outstanding worker or socialist brigade (Mod, 
1974).
One measure of the strength of representative participation is 
the extent to which the trades unions use their right to veto. In fact
* For this reason we think there is little evidence to support the thinking o f  
scholars who believe that worker participation in trades-unionism and in 
company management is a requirement that grows with the advance o f  the 
scientific-technical revolution e.g. automation. They suggest that workers in an 
automated workshop are well informed o f technical and organisational problems. 
Accordingly they can make better use o f  available trades-union rights. The more 
extensive the automation o f production processes, the more interested the 
workers are in participation in plant-wide matters, (fiuza, 1977).
** The group o f questions on trades-unions’ activity have all produced similar 
responses.
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Table 14.3 W orkers’ opinions on trades-union activities
Types o f  activity
This 
activity 
is very 
important
Trades union 
gives 
sufficient 
attention to 
this activity
Trades union 
pays too  
little 
attention to 
this activity
1. Administration o f  workers’ 
complaints and disputes. 95 67 29
2. Improvement o f  workers’ 
financial situation. 91 70 20
3. Provision for organised 
holidays. 89 67 30
4. Improvement o f working 
conditions. 86 64 31
5. Provision for employment’s 
safety. 83 83 !2
6. ‘Humanisation o f work’ 
(e.g. new structure o f  work 
etc.). 77 70 25
7. Influence on the country’s 
general social and economic 
policy. 72 80 11
8. Development of cultural and 
educational activity on 
enterprise level. 70 72 13
9, Incitement o f  workers to 
strong political attitude and 
consciousness (‘consciouness 
forming’). 46 67 25
10. Improvement o f  
productivity. 45 70 21
Source: Hethy and Mako, I975a, p. 110.
the trades unions make relatively little use o f this power*. When a 
veto has been applied it has usually been associated with the 
settlement o f disputes concerning working conditions, and used as 
a last resort. Typical cases include arbitrary managerial decisions, 
such as an unjust reduction of wages, a lowering of the amounts 
available to support home building, inconsistent disciplinary 
practice, etc. Yet in all these matters the unions have rights 
guaranteed by law of which they have failed to avail themselves.
It seems that the veto is only used when no other solution is
* According to the examination o f  the Trade U nion National Council, between 
1968 and 1973 it was only 150 times that the trades-unions exercised this right o f 
theirs. (Trades Union National Council, 1973/36).
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Table 14.4
Question: On whose help can you rely in the following matters?
Matters
On immediate 
supervisor
On trades 
union
Problems of wages and norms. IS 1
Problems connected with work. 87 —
Professional education. 76 2
Improvement of working
conditions. 75 15;
Problems of a personal character. 80 2
Health and social questions. 74 20
Source: Buza, 1977.
available or after pressure from higher trades-union leadership. 
Yet, if a company management gets to know that a veto will be 
applied, it tries to prevent the outbreak of conflict. The 
explanation for this anomaly may lie in the fact that trades-union 
officials who work in local Firms depend on management’s 
goodwill. Although the appointment, classification and salary of 
trades-union officials usually rest with the trades-union centre, 
company management can influence these decisions. A further 
problem is that managers and workers belong to the same trades 
union, and senior managers may sit on a workshop or firm’s 
trades-union committee. This makes it difficult for the union to 
disregard management’s point o f view.
Because o f these problems many workers turn to their own 
managers for assistance rather than to their trade union. (See 
Table 14.4.)
The table underlines the importance of participation based on 
the co-ordination o f different interests. Workers expect help from 
their trades unions in disputes which affect their personal and 
collective interests. But if the trades union is unable to represent 
them effectively, the workers turn to management. This situation 
has within it the danger that the trades union’s role in reconciling 
and mediating between different interests, recedes into the 
background and becomes entirely formal. In order to improve 
trades-union representation o f workers’ interests, an experiment 
was tried in 1975 at the suggestion of the Trade Union National 
Council and the government. In twenty-five firms the 
representative system continued and in another twenty-five firms
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a shop-steward system was introduced. It was found that the shop- 
steward system proved to be more effective in protecting the 
workers’ interests. The Trade Union National Council and the 
Council of Ministers (Council of Ministers, 1977/36) therefore 
decided that from the summer o f 1977 on a shop-steward system 
must be established in all large- and medium-scale works. In small 
works the traditional system o f workers’ meetings, held by the 
unions, continued.
The shop-stewards’ committee which is selected by the workers 
has, the following rights in common with the trades-union 
committees of the enterprise. It can make proposals on the amount 
o f the annual wage increase and on the distribution o f profits. It 
can decide on the final form and modification o f collective labour 
contracts, on the social plan of the enterprise, and on the 
distribution of welfare and cultural funds. It can hold an opinion 
on the annual and medium-term plan of the firm and on the results 
achieved by management.
The development of representative workers’ participation 
through a stewards’ committee leads to a more effective 
safeguarding and enforcement o f workers’ interests. To date, we 
have little experience on how these stewards’ committees will work 
and it will not be possible to draw conclusions for some years. 
However, it can already be seen that the trades-unions are not 
stressing the need for a more direct form o f worker participation. 
The initiative for direct participation is coming almost exclusively 
from management, with the trades union doing little more than 
showing approval. In the next section we describe such a 
management initiative.
Decentralisation of the wage plan: a case study
The problem
In Hungary wage levels are still the most important issue for 
workers. Because of this, great weight is attached to all 
programmes and initiatives that try to bring together workers’ 
demands and management’s requirements in this area. The 
decentralisation of the wage plan is one mechanism for achieving 
this harmony of interests, and this approach means that a decision 
role in determining wages is given to the workers. Effectively this 
extends the responsibilities of workers as they were asked to 
perform tasks previously seen as management’s prerogative.
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The initiative described in the following section took palce in 
one o f the most dynamic and expanding factories of the public 
vehicle industry.*
At the end of the Sixties, due to a change in market 
requirements, management had rapidly to alter the structure of the 
firm’s products. At the same time as introducing new products, 
Diesel engines, the management of the company set high priority 
on the more economic manufacture of its old products, railway 
coaches. In addition to increasing efficiency management also 
wished to reduce the high rate o f labour turnover and both o f these 
problems focused management’s attention on questions of 
organisation and incentives. Labour turnover in recent years had 
increased to such an extent that certain work groups had 
experienced a complete change of members.
The research situation
In the factory where the wage plan was to be decentralised, the 
middle stage of railway coach construction was performed — the 
assembly of the body. The work was carried out in three 
workshops: (1) a spare-parts workshop where sheets of metal were 
cut to the required size, and brackets, etc. were produced for the 
assembly shop; (2) the assembly shop where the body was fitted 
together on the chassis; (3) the finishing shop where fitters 
removed flaws from the sheet metal by heating and hammering. 
All fitters and welders used hand tools and very simple machines 
and appliances. The basis for a group system of wages was 
provided by the co-operative character o f the work process. Where 
a group system was not appropriate, ‘high paying’ and ‘low 
paying’ jobs were designated. For a long time therefore, 
management had used a group system o f payment in which 
workers were allocated an hourly rate of pay.
Management wished to increase the efficiency of production by 
changing the basis for dividing up the earnings at a work group’s 
disposal. Personal rates were to be replaced by earnings which 
were more related to individual output. The workers themselves 
were now authorised to set new personal wage rates, whereas 
formerly the criteria for these were determined by the personnel 
department on the basis o f professional qualifications, length of
* During the period o f  our survey (1969-72) the factory employed about 15000 
manual workers. Its main products included rear axles and engines for vehicles 
and railway coaches, as well as trucks. Other aspects o f  decentralisation of the 
wage plan are dealt with in our study (Hethy and Mako, 1971),
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service, job difficulty, etc., rather than the actual output of 
individual members of the work group.
The hopes o f  management and the reactions o f  the workers
Management hoped that the level of earnings within each work 
group would more closely reflect personal effort and skill. In this 
way the new wage structure would provide more incentive and 
increase the motivation o f the workers. Furthermore, it expected 
that the workers’ willingness to participate in decision-taking 
would grow as in setting wage rates they were making decisions 
that directly affected their personal interests.
Contrary to the management’s expectations, the workers did not 
unanimously welcome their greater independence in the setting of 
wage rates, and two divergent sets of attitudes were encountered. 
The majority o f the work groups — fourteen out o f nineteen — 
made use o f the opportunity offered by the company and changed 
the previous system o f wage rates. Unfortunately, in contradiction 
to management’s objectives, the new wage rates led to more 
uniform levels o f earnings and failed to reflect individual 
differences in output. The other groups did not change the existing 
structure of personal hourly rates and refused the new opportunity 
for decision. In these groups the workers did not wish to alter the 
established pay hierarchy.
How is it that despite a thorough and careful preparation by 
management the workers did not identify with the aim of gaining 
an increase in output by decentralising the wage plan? Why were 
they not eager to make use of increased autonomy in the area of 
wage decisions?
Different interests and different abilities to enforce these interests
It appeared that worker participation in wage decisions was 
influenced by the socio-organisational conditions under which 
they lived and worked. This led to a differentiation of interests 
with the interests of some groups being very different from those 
of others. Similarly, there were considerable differences in a 
group’s ability to achieve its interests. These social factors led to 
the differences in response to the opportunity for participation in 
wage decisions.
Relationships within those groups rejecting the opportunity fo r  
participation in wage decisions were characterised by homogeneity 
(type A). Behaviour was directed at achieving group solidarity and 
frequently these groups had a powerful unofficial nucleus made up
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of a number of cliques.* Members of these groups recognised their 
common interests and were able to enforce these interests officially 
and unofficially. To understand this behaviour we need to know 
something of the economic needs of these workers and of the 
social organisation that produced such strong feelings of 
collectivity.
Before answering these questions, we shall describe briefly the 
structure of the work groups that accepted the opportunities for 
decision taking offered to them. In those work groups that 
identified with management’s objectives (type B) there was much 
less solidarity. There was no nucleus o f cliques to co-ordinate 
different interests and establish common interests. The informal 
structure o f these work groups was unstable and undeveloped and 
they were characterised by internal conflict; the tendency to 
disagree was stronger than the tendency to agree. Therefore they 
are unable to oppose any management initiatives. The social and 
economic characteristics of the members o f gtoups of type A and 
B differed considerably. In the following section we shall describe 
these differences.
The influence of different socio-economic backgrounds
Workers who belonged to work groups of type A differ 
considerably from workers belonging to type B. Their personal 
wage rates were higher and more uniform for differences in skill 
level were minimal. The proportion o f long-service workers, more 
than ten years with the firm, greatly exceeded that of workers 
belong to type B. This is shown in Table 14.5.
Attitudes and behaviour are also influenced by the socio­
economic environment outside the firm, for workers bring with 
them into the factory a number of different orientations towards 
work.** Therefore in order to understand fully workers’ reactions 
to the decentralisation o f the wage plan, we have to go outside the 
firm. Worker expectations which are a product of their socio­
economic backgrounds also affect their attitudes and these 
influences may be stronger than social and organisational factors 
within the firm.
* By cliques we mean an informal unit that has a relatively distinguishable 
structure. Its goals are partly conscious, partly not. The criteria for belonging to a 
clique are related to status, social origin and age. It is a comparatively stable, 
lasting and closed social structure. (Mayntz, 1968).
** When studying the orientation o f  English car workers to production, 
Goldthorpe and his co-workers found similar tendencies.
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Table 14.5 Socio-economic backgrounds of work group members
Type
o f
group
Personal wage rate 
(forints)
A verage coefficient 
o f variation Skilled
Company 
service 
(above ten 
years)
Above
age
thirty
A 8.35 0.64 80.3 53.0 65.1
B 7.85 1.20 78.2 25.2 32.8
Difference
(A -B ) 0.50 —0.56 2.1 27.8 32.3
In work groups o f type A, a majority o f the workers had a 
family and about two-thirds of them were flat-owners or tenants. 
In contrast, in work groups of type B, the proportion of married 
and single workers was equal, while only one-third had a flat.* 
There were also differences in the age structure of work group 
members. A majority o f workers opposing management’s 
suggestions were over thirty, whilst the greater part o f those 
identifying themselves with company objectives were under thirty. 
We recognised here that once workers reach thirty considerable 
changes occur in their social-economic position both inside and 
outside the firm.
An understanding o f workers’ attitudes to financial incentives 
requires a knowledge of how the wage plan developed. Taking 
skilled fitters as an example, we examined the differences between 
the old and new system of personal wage rates. These are shown in 
Table 14.6.
It appears from the table that the wage system suggested by 
management and agreed by the workers reduces the workers’ 
opportunities for pay increases, for the ceiling wage is reached 
more rapidly. This was apparent only to long-service employees, 
since during the first ten years o f employment the new incentive 
system allowed higher wage increases than the old one. It therefore 
strengthened short-term interests to the detriment o f long-term 
interests, although the younger workers did not consider this 
important.
To sum up, management endeavours to alter the wage structure 
produced the following responses:
* The effect o f  housing is very complex in our country, and not only from the 
point o f view o f relations within the enterprise. Housing is today a most 
important economic factor. This can be explained by the fact that the need for 
advance saving, then for paying instalments produces a serious and lasting 
financial ‘pressure’ on the majority o f  workers.
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1. Negative reactions
A refusal to accept the decentralisation of the wage plan or the 
equalisation of wages marked the behaviour of members belonging 
to work groups of type A. These groups were characterised by 
group cohesion and a recognition o f common interests. A minority 
o f these groups rejected m anagem ent’s suggestion of 
decentralising decisions, because this would not lead to higher 
earnings, merely to a redistribution o f current earnings. However, 
a majority of groups appeared to accept management’s objectives, 
but used their increased independence in decision-taking in a 
manner contrary to the suggestions of management. Thus instead 
of earnings becoming more related to output, in fact they became 
more equal and uniform. The workers took as their main objective 
an increase in the earnings o f workers with low wages so that 
group inequalities would be diminished. The intention here was to 
reduce any sources o f conflict within the work group.
Greater equalisation of wages emphasised common interests and 
increased feelings of solidarity; this in turn increased the work 
group's power and ability to enforce its interests. In this way they 
have strengthened their future negotiating position and will be 
better able to accept or reject management proposals on their 
merits.
2. Positive reactions
Working groups of type B were characterised by lack of unity and 
conflicts o f interest and these workers experienced considerable 
pressure from their financial responsibilities outside the firm. The 
majority bore the burden o f founding a family and were either 
saving money for major future investments such as home building, 
the purchase of furniture, etc., or were paying off previously 
incurred credits. The new incentive system meant that they would 
receive a wave increase. They had little industrial experience and 
were unable collectively to pursue their interests. These groups 
also contained young people who lived with their parents and were 
not under financial pressure. Leisure time was the most important 
factor in their lives and they required from work only ‘pocket- 
money’ and an easy time. In work groups of this kind the spread 
of interests was so great that common interests could not develop. 
Collective interests and a collective capacity for enforcing these 
interests did not exist.
A lack of power characterised these groups and therefore they 
could not resist the ideas o f management, nor were they anxious to
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Table 14.6 Wage promotion of skilled workers
The rate o f  wage increases
In the old system o f  In the new system o f  
Company personal wage rate personal wage rate
service
(years) Forints % Forints %
0 — 10 3.0 76.9 3.56 96.1
10 — 20 0.80 20.5 0.12 3.3
20 — 30 0.10 2.6 0.02 _ 0.6
0 — 30 3.90 100.0 3.70 100.0
oppose these. Young married workers with heavy financial 
burdens were interested in higher wages for higher output and 
nothing else. Single workers were indifferent to what happened in 
the work situation. Yet it was only in these work groups that the 
management could realise the objectives associated with the 
decentralisation of the wage plan: a differentiation o f wages and 
an increase in output.
Some lessons
This case study on the decentralisation of a wage plan draws 
attention to the following lessons. Measures that are logical from 
an incentive point o f view may produce unforeseen consequences. 
Even when new ideas are carefully prepared and ideologically 
supported, we have to recognise that workers will not respond to 
them in the same way.
Innovations that combine a desire for higher production with 
more worker authority and autonomy are not always given a ‘good 
reception’. Differences of opinion between managers and workers 
can be understood by examining both group interests and the 
capacity of a group to enforce its interests. Workers are willing to 
assume decision-making duties which involve greater responsibility 
and risk only if these imply a greater ability to project and enforce 
individual and collective interests within the group.
In work groups where there are few common interests, a 
compromise between individual interests and company’s interests 
may be more easily brought about. For the majority o f workers in
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the case study the new incentive system would lead, in the short 
term, to increased wages. In contrast, cohesive work groups with 
perceived common interests can use participation and decision- 
taking opportunities provided by management to further their own 
interests at the expense of management. In the case study they used 
such an opportunity to decrease the wage differences of group 
members.
The case study shows that the concept of job-orientated 
participation — that workers wish to take decisions about their 
own work — is not sufficient to explain participation behaviour. 
Ideas for co-ordinating workers’ needs and management’s 
requirements generally fail to consider differences in individual 
and work group interests and in the ability to enforce these 
interests. This approach is based on the belief that workers’ 
actions can be deduced from a broad understanding o f their needs; 
once these needs are known then it is possible to influence 
behaviour. We do not deny the usefulness o f participation 
programmes based on an identification of needs; for example, 
needs for discretion, autonomy etc. But we argue that 
participation behaviours cannot be deduced directly from needs. 
Human needs are always influenced by the social-organisational 
conditions which determine their satisfaction.
If the case-study management had taken into account not only 
the workers’ needs but also those social and organisational factors 
which influenced the way in which these needs could be satisfied, 
then a compromise of interests might have been possible. Job- 
orientated participation would then have coincided with power- 
orientated participation. Changes in the wage plan had to fit both 
with needs for participation and with the desire of powerful work 
groups to increase group cohesion and reduce potential areas of 
conflict between group members. Hungarian industrial sociology 
is paying increasing attention to these problems.
Models of human behaviour — management — participation
The development of concepts o f worker participation cannot be 
separated from models of human behaviour. In the case-study 
firm management permitted participation only in the execution 
phase of the wage plan and saw the workers as homo- 
oeconomicus. It believed that by taking actions it could produce 
certain responses. Yet it took account of financial motives only 
and designed and applied the incentive systems accordingly. This
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kind o f approach was first set out in the principles of Scientific 
Management. F.W. Taylor described such an approach, although 
without worker participation, when he declared that there was 
only ‘one best way’ o f performing certain tasks. This philosophy 
renders unnecessary all dialogue between workers and managers. 
If management works out scientifically — by means o f time-and- 
motion studies, etc. — the best way of performing tasks, then 
there is nothing left but the selection and training of workers, and 
there is no need to bring the workers and management together. 
Suitably selected and trained workers, once they receive the correct 
wage for their level o f output, will be ready, without reserve, to 
carry out the requirements of management.
In contrast to Scientific Management’s view of man, the Human 
Relations movement emphasised that ‘human beings have not only 
hands, but heart as well’. It emphasised non-financial factors, 
such as social relationships, style of supervision, etc. This 
approach led* to new theories o f motivation and homo 
psychologicus appeared on the management scene. According to 
this theory, organisations function efficiently if both the financial 
and psychological needs o f workers are satisfied. The main task of 
management is then to co-ordinate organisational requirements 
and individual psychological needs.
While Scientific Management saw human co-operation as a 
response to economic factors, motivation theories underlined the 
importance o f psychological needs (Argyris, 1964). A management 
which accepts the homo psychologicus concept welcomes worker 
participation in decisions concerning work activities. Job- 
orientated participation theory is based on this human model. 
Through making worker participation possible, management 
expects in return a positive response to its suggestions.
Economic or psychological models of human behaviour are not, 
however, sufficient to enable us to understand all the phenomena 
associated with the functioning of an industrial organisation. 
These models remove human beings from the complexity o f the 
social-organisational relations. They associate human co­
operation with individual needs and responses. They ignore the 
fact that human co-operation must be seen in a multi-dimensional 
organisational context.
The nature and content o f the social conflicts accompanying 
attempts to achieve co-operation has drawn attention to the 
complexity and instability o f social processes within an 
organisation. Worker behaviour is not only influenced by position 
in the organisational hierarchy and membership of a  work group, 
but also by social relations outside the enterprise. The influence of
324 The quality o f  working life
these external pressures can make workers impervious to 
management influence.
These social-organisational relations are less affected by needs 
than by interests and interests are the main motivating factor in 
industrial organisations. Therefore it is mainly by influencing 
interests that management can affect behaviour. However, 
management has only a limited ability to mould interests within 
the organisation and can exert no influence outside. The workers, 
too, have an ability to enforce their interests which is outside the 
control o f management. This guarantees for them a considerable 
autonomy o f action within the firm or workshop. Therefore the 
process o f co-ordinating interests to secure co-operation cannot 
take place when only management plays an active role and the 
workers are seen as passive by-standers.
In the case study, management tried to increase worker 
participation through a decentralisation of the wage plan, yet 
because this did not coincide with the workers’ interests they were 
able to frustrate management’s intention. The responses of 
workers were determined both by their interests and by their 
ability to enforce these interests. Some work groups had the power 
totally to reject the suggestions of management, and to refuse to 
accept the opportunities for increased participation offered to 
them. Even those groups which accepted a new decision-making 
role used this in a way that did not fit with management intentions. 
Instead o f increasing the differentiation o f wage rates, they 
decreased this.
Management alone cannot create and influence the conditions 
for co-operation within an organisation. Theories .of homo 
oeconomicus and homo psychologicus can only influence worker 
behaviour to a restricted degree. Only by mutual effort can 
management and workers influence the social-organisational 
conditions affecting their interests. The co-ordination of interests 
requires negotiation and bargaining between the two groups. 
Through power-orientated participation it is possible to gain an 
understanding of different interests and to work out a mutually 
acceptable compromise.
To achieve this more is required than creating the conditions for 
job-orientated participation. This wider type of participation 
guarantees for the workers not only control o f work activities, but 
also an influence on the interest and power relationships of the 
enterprise. At the same time it implies a form o f management that 
not only permits, but also requires, continuous bargaining with 
workers and the reconciliation o f different interests. In this way 
management is able to gain an understanding of the complex
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social-organisational conditions that determine what can and 
cannot be done. Considerable progress can only be expected when 
we no longer see job and power-orientated participation as 
mutually exclusive, but as preconditions for each other. The long­
term commitment of workers to participation can only be 
guaranteed in this way.
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